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Abstract 
This paper reports an analysis of the determinants of the level and changes in Polish 
industrial concentration in the early post-transition era. The empirical evidence is based 
on a panel of 144 Polish manufacturing industries over the period 1989-1993. The results 
suggest that both state and foreign ownership have a significant impact on industry 
concentration and this relationship is U-shaped. Minimum efficient scale is found to be 
the only other factor to impact on industry concentration. 3
1. Introduction 
Evidence on the determinants of the level  and changes of industry concentration has 
tended to focus on developed economies (e.g. Levy, 1985; Battacharya and Bloch, 2000; 
Symeonidis, 2000; Ratnayake, 1999; Driffield, 2001). There is limited evidence on 
developing economies (e.g. Blomstrom, 1986; Chou, 1986), however, there is a paucity 
of evidence on the determinants of industry structure in post-transition economies. The 
major competitive shock as a consequence of transition from a centrally planned to a 
mixed economy with capitalist enterprise is a ‘natural experiment’ that offers an 
exceptional opportunity to examine the impact of such shocks on economic activity.
1
On 1 January 1990 a variety of economic reforms were introduced in Poland with the 
intention of increasing competition between firms. The major changes were: first, 
economic activity and prices were deregulated to provide entrepreneurial incentives; 
second, the process of privatising state owned enterprises started; third, foreign 
ownership became more prevalent. Such economic policies were designed to de-
monopolise production because they lowered the entry barriers faced by state, 
cooperative and private firms (Slay, 1995; Ghemawat and Kennedy, 1999). 
Consequently, they are expected to lead to a decline in industrial concentration. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on industry concentration in three ways. 
First, it extends Ghemawat and Kennedy’s (1999) work by examining the determinants of 
the level and changes in concentration using a panel data set covering the early years 
1 The macro and micro economic reforms conducted in Poland from 1990 after the demise of the 
Communist regime are discussed in Slay (1995) and Ghemawat and Kennedy (1999). 4
post-transition. Second, it addresses important features of early transition such as the 
diminishing role of the state sector and increased foreign presence by examining the 
impact of state and foreign ownership on industry concentration. Finally, we seek to 
determine the effect of industry profitability on industry concentration in a post-transition 
economy. 
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 presents the model construction 
and discusses the theoretical motivations behind the inclusion of variables in the model. 
The models to be estimated are also presented in this section. The data are described in 
section 3. The results are presented in section 4 and conclusions are drawn in section 5. 
2. Model specification 
2.1 Model construction 
The empirical approach taken in this study involves estimating a steady-state equilibrium 
model in order to examine determinants of the levels of industrial concentration and 
estimating a model of the determinants of changes of industrial concentration. Note that 
these are reduced form models. The basic model illustrating the factors that affect 
industrial concentration in industry i (i = 1, 2, ..., N) in year t (t = 1, 2, ..., T) is expressed 
as: 
) , , ( it it it it F G S , X f HIit                                                                                        (1) 
where HI is the Herfindahl Index, X is a vector of industry technological barriers to entry; 
S is a vector of strategic barriers to entry; G is a vector of government policy related 
variables, and F is a vector of variables representing international influences.  5
The technological barriers to entry (Xit) include:  
 it it it it SIZE CAPR MES , ,   X                                                                               (2) 
where MES is minimum efficient scale, CAPR is the capital requirement, and SIZE is the 
industry or market size. MES is the lowest quantity of output required to minimise 
average costs and so, for a given market size, is hypothesised to have a positive effect on 
industrial concentration. CAPR is hypothesised to have a positive effect on industrial 
concentration because it measures capital requirements and economies of scale in raising 
capital (Levy, 1985). Larger SIZE is hypothesised to have a negative impact on industrial 
concentration because a larger market can support more firms.  
Strategic barriers to entry are defined as: 
) , ( it it it PCM INTANG   S                                                                                     (3) 
where INTANG is intangible assets and PCM is price-cost margins.
2 INTANG are non-
physical assets and include: goodwill, trademarks, patents, copyrights, and R&D. Firms 
might obtain competitive advantage over their rivals by differentiating their product from 
those of their rivals by: (i) offering a higher quality service to customers which enhances 
customers experience of consuming the product, (ii) investing in R&D in order to 
innovate products, (iii) protecting such product innovations via patent and copyrights in 
order to prevent rivals from replication. The costs of product differentiation arising from 
2 Sutton (1991) argues that research and development (R&D) and advertising expenditures are endogenous 
sunk costs that serve as strategic barriers to entry, which consequently lead to higher concentration. Sutton 
suggests using R&D and advertising intensity to distinguish between industries when estimating 
concentration models rather than estimating a model for all industries. Unfortunately, R&D and advertising 
data are unavailable and so we do not adopt the approach suggested by Sutton. 6
the development and marketing of brands increase the disadvantage to small firms 
(Bhattacharya and Bloch, 2000). Consequently, such costs act as a deterrent to entry and 
lead to increased industry concentration. 
Intangible assets may also serve to reduce production costs and may help incumbent 
firms obtain and sustain competitive advantage via a cost advantage. For instance, firms 
might obtain and sustain cost advantage over their rivals by investing in R&D for the 
purpose of process innovation. Thus, investment in R&D might indicate the possibility of 
producing at a lower average cost in the future. Therefore, if intangible assets are difficult 
to replicate or are too costly to replicate the intangible assets might serve as a deterrent 
and barrier to entry to potential entrants. 
There are two competing arguments for the effect PCM is expected to have on industrial 
concentration. First, there might be a positive relationship between PCM and industry 
concentration because industries with high price-cost margins have an incentive to 
maintain them by keeping potential entrants out (Co, 2001). Second, PCM has a negative 
effect on industry concentration because high price-cost margins are likely to be 
attractive to potential entrants and lead to a decline in industry concentration when new 
entrants actually enter such markets (Evans et al. 1993). Conversely, low price-cost 
margins are unattractive to potential entrants, which might lead to an increase in industry 
concentration. Indeed, Geroski (1995) argues that profitability is an important 
determinant of the rate of entry into an industry with higher profitability leading to higher 
rates of entry. 7
Government industrial policy and involvement in industrial production is defined as: 
it it STATE   G                                                                                                         (4) 
where STATE is the variable capturing government influence on industrial concentration. 
Government policy in relation to the structure and competitive nature of an industry can 
be exerted in a variety ways. Here, five ways are identified. First, the government can 
introduce antitrust legislation that prevents monopoly power per se (Ratnayake, 1999). 
Second, antitrust legislation might not prevent monopoly but prevent (or outlaw) the 
abuse of monopoly power e.g. by preventing predatory pricing. Third, government can 
introduce private enterprise via a privatisation programme. Fourth, the government can 
determine import tariffs and quotas, which affects the extent foreign based firms can 
compete against domestically based firms. Fifth, government can own firms and can 
impact on the structure and competitive practices of an industry by choosing output 
quantity and prices for firms it owns.  
This paper focuses on state involvement in production as described by the fifth point 
above. There are two alternative predictions for the effect of state ownership of firms on 
industry concentration. First, Chou (1986) suggests, in relation to Taiwan, that state-
owned enterprises are large-scale and have low export intensity due to their domestic 
orientation. Given that pre-transition Polish state-owned firms would have been large 
scale and domestically focused (either by design or because they were producing 
relatively low quality products that struggled to obtain significant market share outside of 
Poland), STATE will have a positive impact on industrial concentration.  8
Slay (1995) outlines an alternative argument that predicts STATE will have a negative 
effect on industry concentration. The 1989 Enterprise and Activity Act in Poland 
authorised managers to sell stock in their firms as part of the privatisation process. This 
legislation, however, allowed managers to create bogus firms that functioned as 
repositories for the liabilities of parent firms. The creation of such firms creates more 
firms that will lead to a decline in the Herfindahl Index. The decline in the Herfindahl 
Index reported in Table 2 is suggestive of increased competition, however, such new 
firms will have links to the state firms that created them and such links are not conducive 
to increased competition.  
The international influences that impact on industrial concentration are defined as: 
it it FOREIGN   F                                                                                                   (5) 
There are a variety of international influences that can impact on industrial concentration. 
These include imports, exports and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Government policy 
will impact on all the international influences via tariffs, subsidies, quantity controls and 
legislation on the foreign ownership of domestically located plants. Unfortunately, we do 
not have data on imports and exports nor on the factors through which government can 
impact on international influence of industrial concentration. It should be noted, however, 
that trade liberalisation policies in Poland were reversed during 1991 with tariffs 
increasing and quotas being introduced (Slay, 1995). This would have the effect of 
reducing import competition. Foreign firms might try to circumvent the increase in tariffs 
and the introduction of quotas by setting up new plants or purchasing firms in Poland. 9
FDI, therefore, would be the main mechanism through which foreign competition 
manifests itself. Thus, in this study, the impact of international influences on industrial 
concentration focuses on FDI.  
The effect of FDI on industrial concentration is theoretically ambiguous. FDI increases 
competition because Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are better placed than domestic 
firms to overcome barriers to entry in the host country (Driffield, 2001). This is due to 
special advantages that include superior production techniques, imperfections in input 
markets that allow established firms to purchase at lower prices (Teece, 1985) and the 
specialised knowledge associated with new products, processes and proprietary 
technology (Caves, 1996). Incoming MNEs also have advantages due to the possession of 
specialised assets that include specialised technical knowledge, brand name and 
organisational capabilities (Conyon et al., 2002). Thus, FDI through the role of MNEs 
tends to reduce the level of industry concentration in host country industries (Caves, 
1996)
In contrast, FDI could increase concentration because inefficient small firms exit or 
merge in the face of competition from foreign firms that have advantages compared to 
their domestic counterparts for the reasons outlined above. Blomstrom (1986) suggests 
that, if an underdeveloped country is the host country, the MNEs that invest in it possess 
advanced technology that is suited to serving a market much bigger than that of the host 
country. In addition, foreign-owned firms technological advantage might put them in a 
position to steal market share from their rivals by producing at lower cost than 10
domestically owned firms (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Thus, FDI will increase industry 
concentration by driving local firms out of business (Blomstrom, 1986). 
2.2 Estimating equation 
Following the above discussion the long-run equilibrium model of industry concentration 
is expressed as: 
HIit = E0E1 CAPRit + E2 SIZEit + E3 INTANGit + E4 PCMit + E5 MESit + E6
STATEit + E7STATE
2
it E8 FOREIGNit + E9 FOREIGN
2
it + TiTt + Hit             (6) 
where  Ticaptures unobserved industry-specific factors, Tt captures macroeconomic 
factors common to all industries over time, Hit is an error term, and the remaining terms 
are defined earlier. Quadratic terms are included for the STATE and FOREIGN variables 
in order to examine whether their impact on industry concentration is non-linear. The E’s
are estimated using a two-step generalised method of moments instrumental variables 
estimator (GMM-IV) with INTANG and PCM treated as endogenous. One period lags of 
these two variables are used as instruments. Investment in intangible assets is determined 
by firms’ managers for strategic purposes e.g. to create brand awareness that potential 
entrants cannot replicate without high levels of investment. Thus, intangible assets are 
used as a strategic barrier to entry by incumbent firms c.f. say, MES that is exogenously 
determined by prevailing technological conditions. PCM is treated as endogenous 
because firms choose the prices at which they sell their outputs. In addition, the structure 
of an industry feeds back into prices i.e. the structure of an industry affects firms conduct 
and their price-cost margins. This is the reverse of the arguments explored in Evans et al.11
(1993) who examine the effect of industry structure on prices. The instruments employed 
are a one period lag of INTANG and PCM.
There is an implicit assumption in equation (6) that adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium level of concentration is instantaneous and that industrial concentration in 
Poland is at its equilibrium level. Industry concentration, however, may not be in 
equilibrium due to changing market conditions. Moreover, adjustment in concentration to 
changing market conditions is not instantaneous because there are costs for incumbent 
firms and potential entrants in responding (Levy, 1985). Indeed, the consequences of 
transition are likely to lead to changes in market conditions that might take a period of 
adjustment e.g. from the moment that legislation allows foreign investors to set up 
operations in Poland there will be a period of adjustment during which investors will 
raise finance, build plants, acquire machinery, hire labour, and develop production 
facilities that are operating at optimal level. Thus, there will be an initial increase in 
industry concentration followed by a decline as other firms in the industry and new 
entrants respond accordingly to the new market conditions as a consequence of transition. 
There are also adjustments to changes in technology. If firms receive information at 
different times as to how to attain the lowest possible production cost there will be an 
initial period of high concentration (Klepper and Graddy, 1990). Consequently, high 
concentration may be a disequilibrium phenomenon that is eliminated by competition.  
Given that market structure might be in disequilibrium, the concentration ratio lagged one 
period is included in the set of regressors in Equation (6) in order to capture the 12
persistence in industrial concentration over the sample period. Its inclusion also serves to 
assist in the removal of first order serial correlation. In addition, as determinants of the 
changes in concentration are of concern the model is expressed in first-differences, which 
has the effect of removing industry-specific effects. The model of the determinants of 
changes in industry concentration is therefore specified as: 
'HIit = EO 'HIit-1E1 ' CAPRit + E2 ' SIZEit + E3 'INTANGit + E4 '
PCMit + E5 ' MESit + E6 ' STATEit + E7 ' STATE
2
it  + E8 ' FOREIGNit + E9 '
FOREIGN
2
it + Tt + Hit                                                                                            (7) 
where 'is the first difference operator (i.e. ' Xit = Xit - Xit-1), where O is a parameter to 
be estimated and represents the rate of adjustment to deviations from the industry 
concentration long-run equilibrium and the remaining terms have been previously 
defined. The modelling framework adopted here is similar to that employed by 
Ratnayake (1999). Other studies (e.g. Battacharya and Bloch, 2000; Driffield, 2001) 
consider determinants that affect the speed of adjustment to equilibrium industry 
concentration, we do not adopt this approach. 
The lagged dependent variable, INTANG and PCM are treated as endogenous to the 
model. The motivations for treating INTANG  and PCM are outlined for the equilibrium 
model. First-differencing leads to the lagged dependent variable in equation (7) being 
correlated with the error term and is therefore a potential source of bias. These problems 
are overcome by estimating equation (7) using the first-differenced generalised method of 
moments estimator (GMM-DIF) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This involves 
instrumenting the lagged dependent variable, INTANG and PCM, which are in first-13
differenced form, using the additional instruments of the lags of the levels of these 
variables. Lagged levels of the dependent variable from t-2 back and of INTANG and 
PCM from t-1 back are employed. Crucially, consistent estimation using this technique 
requires the absence of serial correlation in the error term. No evidence of second-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced error term indicates this.  
3. Data 
All industry characteristics used in this paper are calculated from a database containing 
data for Polish manufacturing firms over the 1989-1993 period. This database is 
constructed from the financial reports that all firms employing 5 or more workers are 
legally obliged to submit annually to the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS). The 
coverage of the database is very high, with the firms included representing around 90% 
of the aggregate manufacturing output. Each firm is classified as belonging to a 3-digit 
SIC industry.
3 We aggregate individual firm-level data for a given industry in order to get 
concentration indices as well as various industry level-characteristics. As a result, we are 
able to carry out an analysis at a more disaggregated level and include more explanatory 
variables than can be found in officially released statistics. 
Although, in principle, GUS defines 170 industries, sometimes there are no firms 
classified under the heading of a particular industry in a given year. The appearance and 
disappearance of some industries might be related to the restructuring of the economy. 
3 According to the Polish classification system used by 1993, the manufacturing sector is divided into 24 
two-digit branches, and further into 170 three-digit industries. The codes used are slightly different from 
the published SIC codes but for the majority of industries it is possible to find a match on the basis of the 
description of the product of a given industry. 14
For example, when there is a single firm belonging to a particular industry and this firm 
changes the product mix to the extent that it falls under the heading of a different 
industry, we might see some industries disappearing. In particular, in the period under 
consideration there were only 152 industries where there was at least one firm operating 
in all the years. We also dropped some industries with missing data on one of the 
variables used in estimation. Finally, we excluded the industries for which the Herfindahl 
Index takes the value of one for the majority of observations
4. A model of the 
determinants of concentration has nothing to explain for such industries. Moreover, these 
industries often exhibit massive changes in the Herfindahl Index, which are unlikely to 
occur for economic reasons and might be an outcome of reorganisation. In the end, our 
estimations are based on 144 industries, using the data for 1989 till 1993. After 1993 the 
classification system changed, making it difficult to extend the analysis in a consistent 
way.
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of the variables employed in the 
econometric analysis can be found in Table 1. Variable construction is described in the 
Data Appendix. Except for measures of STATE and FOREIGN, construction of the 
variables is not noteworthy as procedures are used that are typical to a study of this kind. 
4 These industries are not named because GUS regards the information as commercially sensitive. 15
At this juncture a comment on the construction of the STATE and FOREIGN variables is 
made because they are key variables to this study. 
Chou (1986) uses a dummy variable for industries where the percentage output of state-
owned firms is above industry average. In this study STATE is measured in two ways 
using continuous variables. First, the proportion of output in an industry that is produced 
by firms owned and/or controlled by the state (STATE_SHARE). Second, the proportion 
of firms operating in any given sector that is owned by the state (STATE_NUM). Due to 
the paucity of data it is not possible to include further variables that capture the 
government’s effect on industrial concentration. The two measures of STATE, however, 
do proxy the government’s intent to control manufacturing production and to this extent 
they reflect what the government believes are strategically important industries. 
Moreover, if the government has imposed legislation that favours state-owned firms this 
is likely to lead to a positive impact on industrial concentration.  
Two measures of FDI are employed in this study. The first measure, following 
Blomstrom (1986), Ratnayake (1999), and Driffield (2001), is the share of foreign owned 
firms industrial output in Poland (FOREIGN_SHARE) and it is used as a proxy for the 
influence of FDI on host country industry concentration. The second measure, following 
Chou (1986), is the ratio of the number of foreign-owned firms to the total number of 
firms in the sector (FOREIGN_NUM).16
Before proceeding to the results of the econometric analysis the trends in market 
concentration are examined. A frequency distribution, mean, median, and standard 
deviation of the Herfindahl index over the sample period are presented in Table 2. The 
figures in Table 2 indicate that there are generally low levels of market concentration 
over the sample period. In addition, there is evidence of a decline in market 
concentration. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Results
The results of GMM-IV estimation of equation (6), the levels equation, are presented in 
Table 3. In Table 3, F-tests of the time and industry effects indicate that they are not 
significant at the 10% level in the models reported in columns (1) and (2). Thus, the 
reported results are estimates of Equation (6) but excluding the industry and time effects. 
In contrast, F-tests indicate that the explanatory variables are significant at the 1% level. 
The t-statistics are derived from standard errors that are robust to general forms of 
heteroscedasticity and correlation within industries. As the standard errors of two-step 
GMM estimators suffer from finite sample downward bias, they are ‘corrected’ using a 
procedure proposed by Windmeijer (2000). In both columns (1) and (2), t-statistics 
indicate that MES is significant at the 1% while the STATE variables are significant at the 
5% level. Thus, there is evidence consistent with MES being a barrier to entry.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 17
Both the linear and quadratic terms are significant for both STATE measures, which 
indicates that state ownership has a U-shaped relationship with industrial concentration. 
The turning point for this relationship is estimated using the ‘delta method’ (Oehlert, 1992) 
and is reported in Table 5. The turning point for STATE_SHARE is estimated to be 0.68 (i.e. 
when state-owned firms output accounts for 68% of industry output) and is significant at 
the 1% level. It is reported in Table 1 that mean STATE_SHARE is 0.83, which is higher 
than the turning point. Thus, for the mean industry, state-owned firms share of industry 
output has a positive effect on industry concentration. The estimated turning point for 
STATE_NUM is 0.52 (i.e. when 52% of firms are state-owned), which is significant at the 
1% level. Mean STATE_NUM, reported in Table 1, is 0.70. This is higher than the turning 
point and suggests that for the mean industry the proportion of firms owned by the state 
has a positive effect on industry concentration. Note that the turning point for 
FOREIGN_SHARE is found to be significant at the 1% level, however, column (1) 
indicates that FOREIGN_SHARE has no statistically significant effect on industry 
concentration. 
The results of models examining the determinants of changes in industry concentration 
are presented in Table 4. Two-step GMM-DIF estimates are reported. The Windmeijer 
(2000) ‘correction’ is applied to the standard errors in order to adjust for finite sample 
downward bias. Tests of first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals 
indicate that the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation cannot be rejected at 
the 6% and 5% significance levels for estimates reported in columns (1) and (2), 18
respectively. In both models reported in Table 4 there is no statistically significant 
evidence of second-order serial correlation. F-tests indicate that the time dummies are not 
statistically significant for both models, therefore, reported models exclude time 
dummies. F-tests also indicate that the explanatory variables are significant at the 1% 
level for both models. The null hypothesis of instrument validity is not rejected by the 
Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions reported in columns (1) and (2).  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Coefficient estimates presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 indicate the first-
differences of the lagged dependent variable, MES, STATE_SHARE, and 
FOREIGN_SHARE are statistically significant. The remaining variables are not 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The lagged dependent variable is significant at 
the 1% level. This suggests that there is persistence in industrial concentration in Poland 
over the sample period. MES is significant at the 1% level and positive signs on the 
coefficient estimates in columns (1) and (2) indicate that it is a positive determinant of 
changes in the industrial concentration, which is consistent with MES being a barrier to 
entry.  
In column (1) it can be seen that the linear and quadratic STATE_SHARE terms are both 
significant at the 5% level, which indicates there is a U-shaped relationship between 19
STATE_SHARE and HI. The turning point for this relationship is estimated and reported 
in Table 5. The turning point for the STATE_SHARE-HI relationship is estimated to be 
0.69 and is significant at the 1% level. The t-statistics for the linear and quadratic 
FOREIGN_SHARE variables are significant at the 5% level and indicate a U-shaped 
relationship between FOREIGN_SHARE and HI. The estimated turning point, reported in 
Table 5, is 0.26 and it is significant at the 1% level. Note that neither the STATE_NUM
and FOREIGN_NUM variables have a statistically significant impact on industry 
concentration. 
5. Conclusions 
In 1990 Poland embarked on a transition from a centrally planned economy to a mixed 
economy, which involved reducing the role of state-owned firms in the economy. Such 
deregulation consequently allowed an increased role for privately owned firms and 
increased competition between firms. The general decline in industry concentration over 
the 1989-1993 sample period is indicative of increased competition and implies that 
policies to reduce industry concentration are succeeding. 
We find evidence of a U-shaped relationship between state ownership and industry 
concentration. Thus, there is an optimal state-ownership that minimises industry 
concentration. This indicates that state-ownership could have a positive effect on industry 
concentration. Chou (1986) suggests this could be due to state-owned firms being large-
scale and having low export intensity due to their domestic orientation. Additionally, this 
suggests that privatisation policies that involve managers of state-owned firms divesting 20
assets, selling stock and consequently reducing state ownership in the economy will be 
successful in reducing industry concentration. This will lead to a more competitive 
business environment as long as managers of state-owned firms are not creating new 
firms as repositories for the liabilities of state firms as suggested by Slay (1995). As there 
is a negative aspect to the relationship between state-ownership and industry 
concentration, completely eliminating state-ownership of firms will lead to higher 
industry concentration. This suggests that the state can provide competition to privately-
owned firms, which the private sector is unable to provide by itself. 
There is also evidence of a U-shaped relationship between foreign ownership (as 
measured by foreign-owned firms share of industry output) and industry concentration. 
This suggests that there is an optimal foreign ownership that minimises industry 
concentration. The evidence is consistent with the view that FDI leads to increased 
competition for domestic firms because MNEs are able to overcome barriers to entry with 
superior technology and proprietary assets, and that FDI leads to a reduction in industry 
concentration because it forces inefficient firms out of business. The effect that 
dominates depends on the extent of the change in the share of output controlled by 
foreign firms. From the Polish government’s perspective the results suggest that there is a 
case for discouraging large positive changes in the share of output of foreign-owned 
firms. Note that foreign ownership appears to have no statistically significant impact on 
the level of industry concentration. 21
Data Appendix 
Definition of variables 
HI – the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index (equal to the sum of squared market 
shares of all the firms in the industry), where the share of each firm is expressed in terms 
of sales. 
MES – minimum efficient scale as the average size of enterprise contained in the 50
th
percentile of industry sales. It is expressed as a proportion by dividing through by 
industry sales.
CAPR - The industry entry capital requirements calculated as MES multiplied by the 
capital stock-sales ratio. 
SIZE – market size measured by industry sales (in millions of Polish zloty) and deflated 
by the 1988 price index 
5.
INTANG – the ratio of intangible assets (such as patents, goodwill, brand name) to total 
assets.
PCM - price-cost margin is defined as (sales-cost)/sales, where cost includes all costs 
such as intermediate inputs and energy, not just wage bill. 
5 The price index available is at a level more aggregated than the 3-digit classification we used throughout.  22
STATE_NUM – the ratio of state-owned firms to the total number of firms in a given 
industry. 
STATE_SHARE – the ratio of output produced by state-owned firms to total industry 
output.
FOREIGN_NUM – the ratio of foreign-owned firms to the total number of firms in a 
given industry. 
FOREIGN_SHARE – the ratio of output produced by foreign-owned firms to total 
industry output. 23
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description  Mean  Standard 
Deviation
HI Herfindahl Index  0.17  0.18 
CAPR Capital requirement  0.15  0.28 
SIZE Market size (millions of Zloty)  160834.90  238937.40 
INTANG  Intangible assets / Fixed assets  0.97  1.53 
PCM Price-cost margin  0.17  0.16 
MES Minimum efficient scale  0.22  0.22 
STATE_SHARE State-owned firms share of output  0.83  0.26 
STATE_NUM Proportion of firms state-owned   0.70  0.32 
FOREIGN_SHARE Foreign-owned firms share of output  0.02  0.05 
FOREIGN_NUM Proportion of firms foreign-owned  0.03  0.05 
Notes: (1) Variables are expressed as ratios or are weighted unless units of measurement are also 
expressed. (2) More complete definitions can be found in the Data Appendix.27
Table 2 - Frequency Distribution of Herfindahl Indexes Over Time 
Herfindahl Index  Number of 3-Digit Industries 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
0-0.1  60 60 70 80 79 
0.11-0.2  35 39 38 33 31 
0.21-0.3  20 18 15 13 13 
0.31-0.4  9 7 8 7  12 
0.41-0.5  8 9 1 4 1 
0.51-0.6  3 1 4 4 6 
0.61-0.7  4 3 3 2 0 
0.71-0.8  1 4 3 0 1 
0.81-0.9  4 1 2 1 1 
0.91-1  0 2 0 0 0 
       
Median  0.12 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.09 
Mean  0.20 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.15 
Standard  deviation  0.19 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.15 28
Table 3 - Determinants of the Level of Industrial Concentration 
Independent variables  Dependent variable: HIit
 (1)  (2) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 9.49E-3 0.94 2.37E-3 0.29 
CAPRit 0.01 0.72  8.49E-3  0.56 
SIZEit -1.97E-9 -0.19 3.78E-9 -0.40 
INTANGit -4.02E-3 -1.12 -3.14E-3 -0.87 
PCMit 5.00E-3 0.22 -2.99E-3  -0.13 
MESit 0.79*** 31.21 0.79*** 31.71 
STATE_SHAREit -0.05** -2.36     
STATE_SHARE
2
it 0.04** 1.96     
FOREIGN_SHAREit 0.06 1.07     
FOREIGN_SHARE
2
it -0.15 -0.98     
STATE_NUMit    -0.04**  -2.21 
STATE_NUM
2
it    0.04**  2.35 
FOREIGN_NUMit    0.03  0.44 
FOREIGN_NUM
2
it    -0.07  -0.41 
Regressors 278.05 (0.00)  309.70 (0.00) 
Industry 1.39 (0.24)  0.04 (0.83) 
Time  0.36 (0.78)  0.43 (0.74) 
Industry and Time dummies 
included
No No 
Observations 576 576 
Sample Period  1990-1993 1990-1993 
Notes: (i) Heteroscedasticity and within correlation robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
(ii) ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. (iii) 
INTANGit and PCMit are treated as endogenous and one period lags of these variables are used as 
instruments. Models estimated by two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2000) correction is applied to 
the standard errors. (iv) Regressors is an F-test statistic of the joint significance of the 
explanatory variables (excluding industry dummies and constant) with the probability value 
reported in parentheses. (v) Industry is an F-test statistic of the industry effects with the 
probability value in parentheses. (vi) Time is an F-test statistic of the joint significance of the time 
dummies with probability value reported in parentheses. Reported models exclude time effects. 29
Table 4 - Determinants of Changes in Industrial Concentration 
Independent variables  Dependent variable: ' HIit
 (1)  (2) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
' HIit-1 0.14*** 2.96 0.12*** 2.59 
' CAPRit -0.01 -0.54 -0.01 -0.72 
' SIZEit 7.16E-9 0.24 1.48E-8 0.42 
' INTANGit -7.89E-4 -0.86 -3.84E-4 -0.58 
' PCMit -0.03 -1.32 -0.04 -1.36 
' MESit 0.73*** 22.95 0.75*** 19.01 
' STATE_SHAREit -0.07** -2.27    
' STATE_SHARE
2
it 0.04** 1.98     
' FOREIGN_SHAREit -0.12** -2.49    
' FOREIGN_SHARE
2
it 0.23** 2.34     
' STATE_NUMit    0.01  0.20 
' STATE_NUM
2
it    4.58E-3 0.21 
' FOREIGN_NUMit    0.01  0.10 
' FOREIGN_NUM
2
it    -0.09  -0.45 
Serial1 -1.90 (0.06)  -1.96 (0.05) 
Serial2 0.25 (0.81)  0.40 (0.69) 
Regressors 157.51 (0.00)  73.65 (0.00) 
Hansen 19.12 (0.58)  20.69 (0.48) 
Time  0.90 (0.44)  1.22 (0.31) 
Time dummies included  No No 
Observations 432 432 
Sample Period  1991-1993 1991-1993 
Notes: (i) Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses (ii) ***, **, and * 
indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. (iii) ' HIit-1, ' INTANGit and '
CPMit are treated as endogenous. Lags of HIit,from t-2 back and INTANGit and PCMit from t-1 
back are used as instruments. Models are estimated by GMM using the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
technique, two-step estimates are reported. The Windmeijer (2000) finite sample correction to the 
two-step variance-covariance matrix is used. (iv) Serial1  and Serial2 are tests for first and 
second-order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals, distributed N(0, 1) under the null 
of no serial correlation. (v) Regressors  is an F-test statistic of the joint significance of the 
explanatory variables (excluding time dummies and constant) with the probability value reported 
in parentheses. (vi) Hansen is a test of over-identifying restrictions distributed as chi-squared with 
as many degrees of freedom as there are over-identifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is of 
instrument validity with the probability value in parentheses. (vii) Time is an F-test statistic of the 
joint significance of the time dummies with probability value reported in parentheses. 30
Table 5 – Estimates of Turning Points for STATE and FOREIGN Variables 
Column,
Table
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic 95%  Confidence  Interval 




1, 3  STATE_SHARE 0.68*** 3.97  0.34  1.02 
1, 3  FOREIGN_SHARE 0.21** 2.30  0.03  0.38 
2, 3  STATE_NUM 0.52*** 4.67  0.30  0.74 
2, 3  FOREIGN_ NUM  0.20 1.34 -0.10  0.50 
1, 4  STATE_SHARE 0.69*** 5.80  0.46  0.93 
1, 4  FOREIGN_SHARE 0.26*** 6.27  0.18  0.34 
2, 4  STATE_NUM -0.69 -0.10 -13.69 12.31 
2, 4  FOREIGN_ NUM  0.03 0.12 -0.48  0.54 
Notes: (i) Estimates obtained using the ‘Delta method’ (Oehlert, 1992). (ii) ***, **, and * 
indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.